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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW[
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF TiE STATES
OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN H. CRABB *
I.
One of the most enduring and widespread doctrines of law is
that of sovereign immunity. One may speculate the t it is an inher-
ent attribute or consequence of statehood, and that as a result
the concept of sovereign immunity, under varying degrees and
forms of articulation, is as venerable as the concept of the state it-
self. Without essaying an excursion into the uncertain origins of
this doctrine as it has come to be known in modern jurisprudence,,
it became publicized in English common law under the slogan
"The king can do no wrong." This unnecessarily obtrusive expres-
sion of the doctrine caused it to be unpalatable to American courts
after the overthrow of English rule in the colonies, and they ab-
jured any such formulation of a legal principle.-
Nevertheless, it was only this approach and verbalization of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity that was rejected. In a number
of early cases after the Revolution the doctrine was vigorously
applied in both state and federal courts. Indeed, so intense was
the need felt for the substance of the doctrine, that its apparent
impairment by a federal court decision in 1793 wherein article
III, section 2 of the Constitution' was interpreted as subjecting a
state to the court's jurisdiction at the instance of the citizen of an-
other state, 4 promptly gave rise to the eleventh amendment, where-
in such subjection of a state to federal jurisdiction was expressly
prohibited.5
Statements of the doctrine of sovereign immunity have been
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. Apparently it is generally considered to be a post-Roman concept, both as to the
immunity of the domestic sovereign from the jurisdiction of its own courts (see Pugh,
Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 La. L. Rev. 476 (1953) )
and as to the immunity of the foreign sovereign from judicial authority; as to the latter,
the' near universality of the Roman state precluded for the most part the possibility of
there being foreign sovereigns in a status of equality with Rome, and hence the question
of jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign was more theoretical than real, and did not lead to
the formulation of legal doctrine (see Mustoe, Rights and Liabilities of Foreign Sovereigns
and Foreign States as Litigants, 40 Jtrrid. Rev. 150 (1928) ).
2. The slogan was solemnly renounced by the Supreme Court as forming any part of
the law of the United States in Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879).
3. "The judicial power (of the United States) shall extend to all cases . -. -he-
tween a State and Citizens of another State."
4. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
5. This Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."
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made so frequently by courts and writers that it is hardly an ab-
struse or esoteric thing, and little additional discussion of its con-
tent is needed. It may be simply stated as the rule that no sov-
ereign may be subjected without its consent to the jurisdiction
of a judicial tribunal. But it has at least two or three basic aspects.
One is what may be termed the domestic immunity of the sov-
ereign from the jurisdiction of the sovereign's own courts. Another
may be viewed as inte rnational sovereign immunity, whereby the
sovereign is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts of a fore-
ign sovereign (or, in converse expression, whereby courts may not
take jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign). A third facet may be said
to exist, to the extent that a sovereign person may be considered
as distinct from the state of which he is the head, Whereby such an
individual, by virtue of his office alone, is immune from the juris-
diction of any court, foreign or domestic.
Though sovereign immunity is conceded to be an integral part
of the law of the land, a number of American writers have held it
up to a great scorn and obloquy, particularly in its domestic as-
pects.6  Perhaps the Hobbesian maxim ("The king can do no
wrong") which adorned the doctrine when it was imported into
our jurisprudence has been viewed as a nefarious counter-revolu-
tionary device which, if not frustrated, may yet undo the accomp-
lishments of our valiant predecessors of 1776. This may account
at least in part for views sometimes expressed that fall little short
of describing sovereign immunity as a surviving redieval animav
that never had any proper function save its former utility as an in-
strument of torture employed by feudal tyrants in negotiating with
their subjects. At first blush it may seem unreasonable, and per-
haps "undemocratic", that the state should not be accountable for
its acts before tribunals of justice. However, a thoughtful discus-
sion of the' merits or justification of sovereign immunity would in-
volve a consideration of the nature and purpose of the state itself,
and the results that would follow upon abolition of the doctrine.
Such matters are far beyond the modest scope of this discussion.
Nevertheless, it may be pointed out as a partial answer to such
critics that, since the doctrine applies only when the sovereign does
not consent to jurisdiction, waiver of sovereign immunity is avail-
able, and has often been utilized to remedy palpable injustices that
6. In this group,, of writings Tst le iplu red Herbert Barry,,;whose article The
King Can Do No Wrong appears in ,11 Va.-,L. Rev. 349. He thus characterizes sovereign
immunity: "This enlightened doctrine.,0f the government and its agencies being outside
of and above the law is an old story. In fact, it is so old that .it is an anachronism.
But it has not lost its youthful vigor."
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the doctrine may sometimes entail-'as most any general rule of
law is susceptible of doing when its encounters the specific or ec-
centric circumstances of "hard cases". While an excursion into the
large topic of the waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be under-
taken here, it may be noted that these waivers, however wide may
be their effectiveness, in no sense constitute a repudiation or modi-
fication of the doctrine itself. On the contrary, they are more cor-
rectly conceived as explicit reaffirmations of it, since they recognize
that in the absence of waivers the doctrine would apply.7 An ex-
press waiver of only part of the immunity implies that the edifice
itself is to remain intact. Otherwise, the subject having come under
governmental scrutiny, the immunity would have been abolished in
toto, if it as such had been found unsuitable to the conditions of
contemporary society.
It may be cogently argued that it is no justification of sovereign
immunity to say that it may be waived. While the purpose of this
discussion is to give an exposition of rather than a justification for
a particular aspect of sovereign immunity, it is worthy of note that
so eminent a jurist as Holmes defended the concept against vis-
cerally inspired attacks in these words: "A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception of obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right stands.""
The peculiarities of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as ap-
plied to the states of the United States derive from their member-
ship in a federation. It is clear that they are not "states" in the in-
ternational sense of the word, as they have conceded to the federal
government those indicia of sovereignty which would permit them
to claim international personality or statehood. While direct au-
thority appears to be lacking on the point, it may be assumed that
no state of the United States could assert sovereign immunity as a
matter of right before the courts of any jurisdiction outside the
United States. The laws or policies of such jurisdictions would be
operative, and as a practical matter probably the United States
7. These waviers may take the form of the specific consent of the sovereign in in-
dividual cases, or in legislation setting up special courts (e.g., the "Court of Claim," as
in the United States and New York) and procedures specially designed to adjudicate
claims against the sovereign, or exempting generally certain classes of actions against th"
sovereign from the bar of sovereign immunity, a most notable recent example of the
latter being the Federal Tort Claims Act, first enacted in 1946 and revised in 1948.
8. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
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government would intervene in such cases and they would ulti-
mately be disposed of on a political levelY
Yet, for purposes of domestic United States law, it is established
that the states did not abdicate that element of "sovereignty" as
would support their immunity before federal and state courts of
the country, and the Constitution expressly exempts them, as we
have seen, from compulsory jurisdiction of the federal courts, save
only in the event of suit brought by another state.'" The sovereign
immunity of the states then becomes a question of domestic law
within this federal framework. It has its own "domestic" aspect
as applied to each state, and its "international" aspect becomes part
of "interstate" relationships.
II.
With regard to its domestic aspect the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity is in full vigor in each and all of the forty-eight' states.
Some state constitutions do not even permit the state to waive its
immunity." In rationalizing the rule, it has been stated that a
judgment against the state would be illogical, as there would be
no way to enforce the judgment, if there had been no consent to
the suit, and hence no funds out of which a judgment might be
paid. 2 Moreover, the subjection of public funds to seizure at the
instance of a private party would be subversive of the public in-
terest and impose an undue burden on the functioning of the gov-
ernment." And, since the court is but an arm or agency of the
state, it can only apply the standard of justice adopted by the state
itself; hence, it is pointless for the court to interfere, as the claim-
ant may submit his claim directly to the legislative or executive
brapeches of the state, since they presumably would see to the pay-
ment of a just claim in the first instance, and if they were disposed
to be unjust and tyrannical, a judicial pronouncement, whose en-
forcement would depend upon them, would be of little efficacy.'1
The absolute domestic sovereign immunity of the states has been
equally applied by the federal courts, where the states have been
9. For further discussion along this line, see infra at footnote 28.
10. See Willis, Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity Under the U. S. Constitution, 15 Va.
L. Rev. 437 (1929).
11. This appears to be or have been the case at least in Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois
and West Virginia. See Note, Immunity of State Agency from Suit, 43 W. Va. L. Rev.
266 (1937).
12. University of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 197 A. 123 (1938).
13. See Note, Sovereign Immunity of the States: the Doctrine and Some of Its Re-
cent Develpoments, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 234 (1956).
14. Such a line of argument, without being further developed, scarcely disposes of
all objections to it. See Pingrey, State Sovereignty Superior to Courts, 20 Cent. L.J. 167,
(1885) and Note, Liability of a State to be Sued in General, 12 Ia. L. Rev. 309 (1927).
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held immune from suit by their own citizens as well as by those
of sister states. 15 The fact that federal question may have been in-
volved has not affected the applicability of the state's immunity in
federal courts.1 6
An attack on the sovereign immunity of the states in federal
courts was made in Hans v. Louisiana1'7 where a citizen of Loui-
sana sued the state on its bonds in federal courts. The plaintiff
contended that since the eleventh amendment merely stated that
federal jurisdiction did not extend to suits against a state by citizens
of another state, it had no applicability to suits against a state by
its own citizens. However, the court found that the narrowness of
the language employed in the amendment could be ascribed to the
fact that it had been devised for the purpose of undoing the effects
of Chisholm v. Georgia,' and there was hence no implication
that the traditional concept of the state's sovereign immunity was
otherwise compromised.
A most interesting and vigorous application of the domestic
sovereign immunity of the states occurred in Monaco v. Missis-
sippi.' 9 This appears to be the, only case in American legal history
where a foreign sovereign state, as such, sought to sue one of the
United States. The principality of Monaco brought suit in federal
court against Mississippi on some bonds issued by that state and
subsequently assigned to the principality. Generally, the courts of
a sovereign state are available to suit by a foreign sovereign recog-
nized by and enjoying friendly relations with the forum state.21
Monaco was such a foreign sovereign, so far as the United States
was concerned, and American courts would normally be bound
under general principles of law and policy to entertain suits by
Monaco against private parties. Therefore, the possibility seemed
to exist for placing a limitation on the domestic scvereign immu-
nity of the states by not permitting them to assert their immunity
in American courts when the plaintiff was a friendly foreign sov-
ereign, on the theory that otherwise the state, is interfering with
matters of foreign policy, which are solely within the competence
of the federal government. Since no. state of the United States is
a "state" in terms of international law and usage, a foreign sov-
15. E.g., O'Connor v. Slater, 22 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1927), appeal dismissed, 278
U.S. 188 (1929).
16. E.g., In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), where federal admiralty
jurisdiction was involved.
17. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
18. See footnote 4, supra.
19. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
20. This well settled rule is set forth by the language of the court in Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
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ereign would not consider that it was suing a sovereign in our
courts when suing a state, and hence would regard the raising of
the bar of sovereign immunity as an act of bad faith and disruptive
of the comity existing between it and the United States. And the
United States might be subjected to retaliatory treatment in the
courts of the affronted foreign sovereign. Therefore, the argument
would conclude, sovereign immunity would not be available to a
state of the United States in cases where the plaintiff party was a
foreign sovereign.
Of course, when such a miniscule foreign sovereignty as Monaco
is involved, no substantial foreign policy problems are likely to be
apprehended. Conceivably, where the importance of the foreign
state or other circumstances of the case were such that the niational
interests of the United States might suffer material detriment from
a state's asserting its sovereign immunity against a foreign power,
the federal courts might feel bound to deny the immunity, or at
least to make inquiries of the federal executive as to the affect of
the case dn foreign policy matters and be guided by the replies
received. Nevertheless, in the absence of any such developments,
Monaco v. Mississippi remains as a staunch bastion of the domestic
sovereign immunity of the states.
III.
It is to be borne in mind that the according of sovereign imnmu-
nity, whether to a domestic or a foreign sovereign, is a question
of the lex fori. Thus, whether a foreign sovereign will receive im-
munity may vary from one jurisdiction to the next, accordingly as
each jurisdiction regards the rules of sovereign immunity and as
each may regard the asserted sovereignty of the foreign party. On
the international plane, the granting of immunity may hinge upon
political matters, the chief of which being whether the! sovereignty
of the foreigner has been recognized by the government of forum.
Considerations of this type: are absent as between the states of the
United States, all of whom take judicial notice of each other's ex-
istence and statehood, and repeatedly reiterate the comity that
subsists between them. Thus, the immunity of a state from juris-
diction of the courts of a sister state was recognized at the outset
of independence from Great Britain.21 However, there have been
some subsequent indications of possible limitation on the absolut-
ism of the immunity of a state in the courts of a sister state.
21. Nathan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dallas) 77 (1781).
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This possible limitation grows out of modifications of the general
doctrine of sovereign immunity that have developed as a result of
the modem tendency of states to engage in activities and enter-
prises which have not been traditionally deemed as part of the
function of sovereignty. The question then arises whether the sov-
ereignty of the state renders it immune even as to those activities
that have nothing to do with the discharge of its sovereign func-
tions, and are the same sort of business that may properly be con-
ducted by private parties. The absolutist view is that the immunity
derives from the character of the defendant as a sovereign (ratione
personae) and hence it is immaterial what may be the nature of
the act giving rise to the claim against the sovereign. The oppos-
ing or limited theory is that the immunity attaches by reason of
the character of the activity in which the sovereign was engaged
(ratione materiae) and which gave rise to the claim against the
sovereign, and the immunity will be limited to those claims deriv-
ing from acts performed in the discharge of sovereign functions.22
Both of these views appear to have found application in state
courts, although this terminology has not been employed by them.
North Dakota appears to have opted in favor of the absolute
ratione personae theory in Paulus v. South Dakota.'3 South Dakota
owned coal mines in North Dakota, and the plaintiff upon being
injured as an employee in these mines brought an action against
South Dakota in North Dakota courts under the North Dakota
workmen's compensation statute. With regard to South Da-
kota's right as a sovereign, the plaintiff contended that the own-
ing and operating of coal mines was not an activity partaking
of the attributes of sovereign behavior and hence South Da-
kota could not assert its immunity as to them. But the court took
the view that it was the prerogative of South Dakota to deter-
mine those activities in which it might properly engage as a
sovereign. It pointed out that there is no technical or clear dis-
tinction between those acts which are sovereign in nature and
those which are not, and moreover the practice of sovereigns as to
which acts of theirs are customary or characteristic of their status
is subject to change and evolution with the passage of time. It is
possible to point to various salient facts of this case as bases for
limiting and distinguishing it, as did the Georgia court as indicated
22. For a discussion of the absolute and limited theories (and of the Latinisms which
have been devised for their embellishment), see Garcia-Mora, Doctrine of Sovereign Im-
munity of Foreign States and Its Recent Modifications, 42 Va. L. Rev. 335 (1956).
23. 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52 (1929).
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in the discussion which follows. Nevertheless, the tenor of the
Paulus case is clearly a strong endorsement of the ratione personae
theory of sovereign immunity, as applied to a sister state of the
United States.
Georgia, however, refused to accord sovereign immunity to
Florida in an attachment suit brought against certain property
located in Georgia and owned by Florida in connection with the
operation of the state hospital. 24  The court rested its decision in
part or alternatively on the ground that since this was an attach-
ment proceeding, only the property itself was subjected to compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Georgia court, and if Florida chose to ap-
pear to defend its property it did so on its own motion in the same
manner as it might have appeared as a plaintiff. Had -the
case been disposed of solely on such grounds, the issue of sov-
ereign immunity would have been largely side-stepped. But in
addition the court found that in entering Georgia for this, purpose,
Florida was not acting in its sovereign capacity, as the operation
of hospitals for the insane and collateral activities in support of
them were not within the orbit of cognizable state activities. The
court saw no reason for favoring Florida; if it was going to com-
pete with citizens of Georgia in matters of business and commer-
cial behavior, it could not claim immunity from Georgia citizens'
suits against it in Georgia courts. The Paulus case was recognized,
but distinguished on the ground that the, plaintiff there was a citi-
zen of the state being sued; however, a closer study of these cases
does not support the distinctions the Georgia court sought to make,
and they are more realistically viewed as being in opposition.
The states of the United States are not unique political phenom-
ena, and other federated states exist in the world, with varying
degrees of autonomy and apportionment of powers between the
central and state governments. Instances have occurred of states
of other federal unions being sued in federal and state courts of
the United States and the issue of their sovereign immunity has
arisen. The treatment accorded such states is instructive for the
light it sheds on the extent to which the sovereignty of the states
of the United States is regarded as but a matter. of domestic fed-
eral law, and the extent to which they are sovereign within the
meaning, at least, of the principles governing sovereign immunity.
24. Florida State, Hospital for Insane v. Durham Iron Co., 66 Ga. 350, 17 S.E.2d
842 (1941). The attachment proceedings were brought against the governor of Florida
and the various state officials comprising his cabinet, but it. was treated by the court as
making the State of Florida a party to the litigation.
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In such instances the courts are free to apply their interpretations
of the doctrine without limitation by the structures of the federal
constitution and its regulation of relations between states. To the
extent that the states of these foreign federations occupy a status
similar to that of the states of the United States, presumably their
entitlement to the enjoyment of sovereign immunity should be
similar.
The defendant in Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado
de Henequen"2 was a corporation, at least quasi-public in, nature,
and the defense was raised that this involved a suit against the
Mexican state of Yucatan, which, as a state of a federal union, was
entitled to immunity in the same way as a state of the United
States. While the decision rested in part on, the aspect that this
was a suit against a foreign corporation rather than the state of
Yucatan, the court nevertheless seemed to feel that in any event
there would have been no necessity to accord immunity to an
entity such as Yucatan, which, being but a member of a federation
of states, had no sovereignty of its own to assert, as Mexico alone
was sovereign over the territory known as Yucatan. The defendant
urged that the municipal law of the United States and New Jersey
accorded sovereign immunity to the states of federations, but the
court sought refuge from this contention by saying that in any case
the defendant was a corporation, and not the state of Yucatan.
However, a federal court decision exemplified greater respect to
the two Brazilian states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul.2
After disposing of the attempt of the Brazilian government to in-
tervene in the suit, the court stated that these two stdit6s could
claim sovereign immunity in their own-rights. The court stated
that the facts laid before it by the Brazilian ambassador and the
State Department, of whom inquiries had been made, compelled
the conclusion that "Brazilian states occupy in the Brazilian union
a status comparable to that of our own states in the American
union." Although recognizing controversy and uncertainty as to
the suability of the constituent states of a federal union, the court
concluded: "It seems clear to us that the law should accord the
immunity which we claim for our own states (Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, supra) to foreign states whose constitutional position is the
same."
An indication of how the sovereign immunity of states of the
United States might fare abroad may be gleaned from the refusal
25. 91 N.J.L. 382, 103 A. 397 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
26. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941).
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of a French court to accord such immunity to the Brazilian state of
Ceara, because of its lack of international personality.27 It is doubt-
ful that an American state could urge that it had more "stateness"
or sovereignty than a Brazilian state, or that a foreign court would
investigate the internal structure of various federal unions, so as to
differentiate between them and grant or withhold immunity on the
basis of the degree of sovereignty discovered in the instance of
each union or each state. All such embarrassments can be avoided
by limiting the immunity to states that are sovereign in the inter-
national sense. Yet, such a court might still grant immunity to a
political subdivision of its own federal and complex sovereignty,
as did the British court in Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan28
Probably the general attitude of American courts with regard to
the immunity of states of the United States outside their own,
courts or in courts of sister states is reflected in the opinion of
Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank29 quoted with ap-
proval in Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, supra: "The doctrine is
not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridi-
cal theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual admin-
istration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and
property, from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their
rights." While the universal validity of this definition may be
doubtful at best, it clarifies thinking about the doctrine in that it
frankly admits that "sovereign" immunity is broader than it pur-
ports to be, and may be applicable to entities that could not prop-
erly be generally characterized as sovereign.
IV.
The term "sovereign" may be used in an abstract sense to refer
to the state or the government of it, without specifying any partic-
ular person or office or institution as being the repository of sov-
ereignty. Indeed, a great deal of philosophical energy and cere-
bration has been expended in searching for the exact site which
either does or ought to serve as the repository for this elusive, if
not chimerical, phenomenon. However, the term may also be used
to refer to the flesh-and-blood person who serves in the capacity
of head of state.
Depending on the constitutional form or political theory in force,
the head of state may either himself possess the totality of the
27. State of Ceara v. Do, Cour de Cassation, [192 , Receuil Dalloz 196.
28. [1924] A.C. 797.
29. 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
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state's sovereignty, or be merely the highest official representative
of the sovereignty, which resides elsewhere than in his person-
presumably, in the people. But irrespective of the rule or theory
of sovereignty applicable to a particular state, the titular head of a
sovereign state is entitled to personal immunity from courts' juris-
diction. While there has been some doubt cast upon the personal
sovereign immunity of the president of a republic when he is not
acting in his official capacity,30 it appears that a president will be
accorded personal sovereign immunity on the same basis as a
monarchical head of state, irrespective of a president's technical
standing as a "sovereign".3
The interest in this point for purposes of this discussion is
whether the governors of the states can assert personal immunity
from judicial process on the basis of their status as princes or heads
of states. If the states are sovereign, at least for purposes of ap-
plication of the sovereign immunity principle, will their governors,
as heads of state, enjoy the same personal immunity that is accord-
ed to epiperors, kings, presidents, and other princes?
It seems quite clear that this aspect of sovereign immunity does
not apply to the states or their governors. Courts may decline to
entertain suits against governmental agencies, corporations or offi-
cers on the grounds that the suit, under the particular circumstan-
ces of the case, or the particular characteristics of the named de-
fendant, is essentially one against the state itself, from whom the
defendant is indistinguishable. The courts would consider them-
selves without jurisdiction because of the operation of the prin-
ciples of sovereign immunity. Another basis for denying relief
against such defendants is not lack of jurisdiction, but because the
matter at issue involves the prerogatives or discretion of public
officials or bodies, which have been accorded to them by the law of
the jurisdiction, and judicial intervention would be improper. The
latter type of situation does not involve any principle of jurisdic-
tional immunity, as jurisdiction will be entertained for the purpose
of determining whether the matter at hand involves official acts
beyond the scope of judicial fiat. And, provided the suit does not
fall within the former category as being one against the state itself,
the court may grant the relief sought on, proper proof, such as
abuse of discretion or unauthorized acts on the part of the de-
fendant.
30. See Peterson, Rights and Immunities of A Sovereign Ruler, 88 Cent. L.J. 28
(1919), and Glenn, International Law (1895).
31. See Fenwick, International Law, 307 (3rd ed. 1948).
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With regard to subordinate officials or agencies of the state,
sovereign immunity could only be an issue to the extent that they
succeed in identifying themselves with the state. Nor does a gov-
ernor as defendant raise an issue as to his own personal immunity
as a "sovereign" or "prince" if he claims identification with the
state or that the matter in question is solely within his official
capacities and discretion. In other terminology, such as appeared
earlier in the discussion, unless the governor asserts immunity
absolutely (ratione personae) on the basis of the sanctity of his
person rather than qualifiedly because his acts of which complaint
is being made were done in his official capacity (ratione mate-
riae), he does, not assert any immunity peculiar to himself distinct
from that of the state.
It has rarely occurred that any governor has sought immunity on
the theory of the sanctity of his person as head of the state. How-
ever, it cannot be said that there has been any general authorita-
tive dogma against such a rule of law as part of American juris-
prudence. That it remains an unresolved issue is indicated by the
fact that in a case of quite recent vintage 32 a defendant governor
asserted that the court had no jurisdiction over his person, al-
though it proved not to be necessary to decide the point in dispos-
ing of the case.
The typical suit in which a governor is apt to be made defendant
is usually an injunction or mandamus action, with the center of
controversy being official acts or determinations by the governor.
It does not appear that any governor has ever attempted to assert
in a federal court personal immunity from jurisdiction. His re-
sistance to the suit has been usually based on a contention that the
complaint involved acts within his official authority and discretion.
Federal courts have assumed jurisdiction for the purpose of decid-
ing these issues. In so doing, the courts necessarily decide not only
whether they have jurisdiction, but the substantive question of
granting the relief sought as well. For, if courts have jurisdiction
of a governor only when he is behaving unlawfully or in excess of
his powers, by deciding they have jurisdiction they have also de-
cided that the governor has misbehaved in the manner alleged as
entitling the plaintiff to relief. This clearly amounts to no "im-
munity" at all, and places governors on no different footing than
any other public official.
This judicial attitude in the federal courts was exemplified by
32. State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, 45.Wash. 2d 82, 273 P.2d 464.
1958]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
two cases for injunction against the governor of Minnesota growing
out of industrial disturbances in the state. In one of these 3 it was
stated that the injunction would lie because the governor had ex-
ceeded his executive powers, while it was denied in the other case.
In denying the injunction the court stated: "Within the range of
the Governor's permitted discretion, his acts are not subject to the
regulations or control of the judiciary. Arbitrary and capricious
acts of the Governor, and those having no relation to the necessities
of the situation, may be enjoined by the courts, as any clear abuse
of power by an executive may be enjoined." 4
It appears, then, that the restrictions on the federal judiciary as
to jurisdiction over states, as set forth in the eleventh amendment,
do not operate in favor of state governors. It is true, that if the
suit against the governor is construed as being against the state,
sovereign immunity will be a bar to the jurisdiction. 5 This, of
course, involves the immunity of the state rather than the governor.
And the state courts have frequently issued injunctions and man-
damus orders against their own governors. While suits for such
relief are often denied, it has not normally been for lack of juris-
diction of the governor's person, and no inherent repugnancy has
appeared regarding the concept of subjecting a governor to the
courts of his own state. The prevailing view in the states was
succinctly expressed in Hollman v. Warren, Governor:36 "General-
ly speaking, it is settled in this state that in an appropriate case, a
writ of mandate will issue against the Governor of the state." The
statement would be just as valid for injunctions, and no doubt for
actions of prohibition and in the nature of quo warranto as well.
Yet, there is authority to the contrary as well. In Arkansas and
Massachusetts there have been court opinions which seemingly
recognize the inviolability of the person of the governor through
judicial process. In the former jurisdiction, the court has found
that the executive of the states, like the President of the United
States, are not liable to having their acts examined by the courts.3 7
And in the latter instance, Chief Justice Knowlton reasoned as fol-
lows ir abjuring the concept of a governor as amenable to cou-t
jurisdiction: "An order under a writ of mandamus against the Gov-
ernor, if he should refuse to obey it, might present the, strange
33. Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936).
34. Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934).
35. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Peters) 110 (1828).
36. 32 Cal.2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948).
37. Hawkins v. the Governor, 1 Ark. 570 (1839).
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spectacle of a direction by the court to the executive forces of the
government, to coerce and punish the chief executive officer of the
state, who commands and controls the military forces that are utli-
mately relied upon for the maintenance of law and order. It seems
better to hold that, for whatever he does officially, the Governor
shall answer only to his own conscience, to the people who elected
him, and in the case of the possible commission of high crime or
misdemeanor, to a court of impeachment."3 18
But even the foregoing language would limit the governor's im-
munity to his public or official acts or capacities. If a truly abso-
lute and full-blown sovereign immunity were to be enjoyed by a
governor, he would also be immune from suits relating to his per-
sonal matters having no connection with his office. Here indeed
would be a theory of immunity tracing back to the mystique of
anointment into the exalted ranks of princes, and, on the more
practical level, to a time when the public treasury was hardly dis-
tinguishable, if at all, from the prince's personal estate. How diluted
and temperate would be the joy with which the American electo-
rate would receive such a doctrine! For that reason alone, it
would be politically suicidal, and thus substantially impossible, for
a governor to employ such a means of defense.
An attempt by a foreign governor to assert personal immunity
when sued in the jurisdiction on a purely personal indebtedness
was rejected in American Industrial Finance Corp. v. Sholz.- The
governor of Florida was served with process in Illinois, when that
prince was attending an American Legion convention in Chicago,
allegedly pursuant to his official duties. However, the court found
he was there as a private citizen, so that he, was unquestionably
subject to jurisdiction; whether he might have been exempt from
jurisdiction for such a suit if he had been considered to be in Illi-
nois on official business of Florida, is not settled in this decision.
Therefore, it appears that governors are not accorded the im-
munities as heads of states consistent with the qualties of sov-
ereignty with which American courts vest those states. This may
be viewed as a logical consequence of the artificiality of the sov-
ereign immunity of the states of the United States. The immunity
of heads of truly sovereign states follows as a matter of course and
practicality, and the affairs of states and harmonious relations be-
tween them could not get on if their courts were to take jurisdic-
38. Rice. v. Draper, 207 Mass. 577, 93 N.E. 821 (1911).
39. 279 Ill. App. 45 (1935).
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tion of their own and foreign princes. Because the states of the
United States are not truly sovereign, and they do not conduct
relations with other states, the justifications or necessity that sup-
port the immunity of heads of actually sovereign states do not
apply to the states of the United States.

